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  In this paper we examine how an interest group with limited resources (votes 
and campaign contributions) nevertheless effectively influenced political policy through 
the control of information to general voters. Voters in turn lobbied politicians to take 
actions desired by the interest group. Our focus is on the Landless Peasants Movement 
(Movimento Sem-Terra) or MST and its success in invigorating land reform in Brazil. 
Although we direct attention to the MST, our analysis can be generalized to interest 
group behavior in other settings.  
We analyze the politics of land reform in Brazil through a model that takes into 
consideration the constraints faced by the President in determining how many resources 
to devote to interest groups.  Although there are well-organized, wealthy constituents, 
large property owners, who oppose land reform, we show how the MST effectively 
countered by affecting how voters perceive the government’s land reform efforts.  In 
general, urban voters support rural land reform, but since it does not directly affect 
them, they have little incentive to determine whether or not the government’s claims of 
action are consistent with actual resource allocation. Indeed, prior to the mid 1990s and 
the effective rise of MST, despite broad voter backing, there was little progress on land 
reform. Entrenched opposition from property owners and the inability of voters to 
monitor government policies resulted in assertions of action with little practical results. 
After 1993, however, the pattern changed and we analyze how this occurred.  
 
 
II. Background:  Land Reform in Brazil. 
  Brazil has long had one of the most concentrated land ownership structures in 
the world. Approximately 45% of the agricultural land is held by the largest 1% of farm 
owners, and large tracts of this land are not used. The Gini coefficient of 0.85 in 1985 
was the 9
th highest in the world, only behind countries like Panama, Barbados, and 
Guam (FAO/UN, 2004).
1 In terms of the size of the population affected it is certainly 
among the most problematic cases with more than 4 million landless peasants 
                                                 
1 The ten highest Gini coefficients in the FAO dataset (www.fao.org/es/ess) are Barbados (0.94, 1989 
data), Paraguay (0.93, 1991), Guam (0.88, 1987), Virigin Islands (0.87, 1987), Panama (0.87, 1990), 
Bahamas (0.87, 1994), Peru (0.86, 1994), Spain (0.86, 1989), Brazil (0.85, 1985), Argentina (0.83, 1988).  2
estimated
2, a contingent bigger than the entire population of some of those countries 
(Panama – 3 million, Barbados – 0.265 million, Guam – 0.166 million). 
  Concentrated land holdings grew out of the Brazilian colonial experience, and 
since the 19
th century there have been repeated efforts by the central government to 
“substitute small holdings for latifundia” [Dean, 1971:624]. This desire was to a large 
extent motivated by the comparison with the United States where an equalitarian system 
based on small family farms was proving to be highly successful in attracting migration 
and generating economic growth. In 1938 the federal government created the Land and 
Settlement Division which focused mostly on distributing public land. In 1946 the 
Constitution introduced the notion of expropriation of a private farm if it were not 
fulfilling its “social function,” allowing latifundia to be expropriated. After the military 
coup of 1964, the government viewed land reform as key to economic development, but 
even 21 years of a military dictatorship did not lead to serious changes in the 
distribution of land ownership. With return of civilian rule further attempts were made, 
and indeed, every new government had a special land reform program with ambitious 
goals that featured prominently in party platforms and election campaigns.   
But little of consequence happened. The Gini coefficient barely budged. In 1960 
it was 0.842; in 1978, and 1998, 0.843. Very large farms of over 1,000 hectares also 
continued to dominate land holdings. In 1940 1.5% of the farms held 48.3% of 
farmland; in  1960 1.0% held 44.1%; and in 1980 0.9% held 45.1%, and in 1996 1.1% 
held 45.1%.
3  
Despite this lack of action, the general electorate has long been sympathetic to the 
notion of land reform, a natural reaction given such salient inequality.
4 This broad 
constituency for land reform, however, is unorganized, heterogeneous and has only 
limited information regarding how much land reform is being carried out. Rural property 
owners have steadfastly opposed it.
5 Historically, they were well organized and provided 
                                                 
2 This is the estimate typically given by the Landless Peasants Movement. The Lula government’s II 
National Plan for Agrarian Reform (Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário, 2004) puts the demand for 
land reform at 3.1 million, or 5 million if one counts those who have land but in an insufficient amount. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization estimated the demand for land reform in Brazil at 2.5 million 
families in the mid-nineties (Romeiro et. al. 1994). 
3 Gini coefficients presented here are from Incra (2001a) which tries to deal with several of the 
methodological difficulties in the calculation of this index. 
4 Evidence to back this statement will be given in Section III. 
5 See Mueller (1998) for an incidence analysis on which groups were affected by land reform and 
econometric measurement of their effect on land reform policy.  3
support to politicians through contributions and votes. They were represented by several 
organizations, such as the Brazilian Rural Society (Sociedade Brasileira Rural) and 
especially by a large group of Congressmen from various parties, known as the ‘rural 
bench’ (bancada rural), that united to promote the interests of land owners and 
agricultural producers. As a result until after 1993, the pattern was for politicians to call 
for aggressive land reform during electoral campaigns, and for little to be implemented 
once the election was over.  So long as large landowners could deliver more support than 
could landless peasants, and so long as voters had little information on the actual state of 
land reform, politicians devoted few resources to it.  
The pattern began to change when the MST (organized in 1985) took advantage 
of the new Constitution of 1988 that mandated the federal government to expropriate 
and redistribute unproductive properties and enabling complementary legislation that 
was passed in 1993.
6 By the mid 1990s, the MST had honed its strategy of invading 
unproductive properties with elaborate press coverage to demonstrate the plight of the 
landless poor. This new public relations effort galvanized voters and spurred the 
government to act on land reform.
7 As the numbers of invasions multiplied, urban 
voters were continually reminded of the task at hand, and land reform moved to the 
forefront with real resources devoted to it.   
  The purpose of this paper is to analyze how the MST influenced policy making 
in land reform so effectively. It is one of the most successful grassroots movements in 
the world and is frequently held as a model of interest group effectiveness even though 
it lacks direct voting power and funds to contribute to politicians.
8 We show how the 
MST has used its strengths to influence the level of information received by voters.  
There is a large literature on the role of interest groups as transmitters of 
information (see Austen-Smith 1999, Grossman and Helpman 2001 and Van Winden 
1999 and 2003 for surveys), however, the flow of information in that literature is almost 
                                                 
6 Although the Land Statute of 1964 already provided the legal basis for expropriations, the new 
Constitution broadened the scope for the use of this instrument, made it easier to use and, most 
importantly, signaled the disposition of government and society that land reform should be pursued with 
high priority. 
7 For the history of the MST and an analysis of their organization, thinking and impact see Wright and 
Wolford (2003). 
8 Noam Chomsky was cited by the Economist (2004) as stating that the MST “…is the most exciting 
popular movement in the world today.”  4
always from the interest group to policy makers to influence their actions.
9 In this paper, 
however, MST is modeled as revealing information to voters, who in turn pressure 
politicians for policy change.  In our earlier papers (Alston, Libecap and Mueller,1999a, 
1999b, 2000) we described how MST invasions generated negative publicity for 
politicians, stimulated broad sympathy toward the landless, and led to further invasions. 
We were interested in explaining the pattern of invasions and modeled government 
intervention as exogenous. Here, however, we seek to explain the level of government 
action in land reform by endogenizing government activity. This is done through a 
multiple-principal, multiple-task principal-agent model where the government faces 
pressure from several interest groups and the electorate to pursue several different 
policy objectives. Each interest group exerts pressure by providing the government with 
votes (political support or opposition), contributions, or by affecting the information 
asymmetries faced by all interest groups and the voters concerning the government’s 
true level of effort on each policy. The choice of which channels of influence to pursue 
depends on each interest groups’ comparative advantage with each of these instruments. 
We argue that the MST has characteristics that make it particularly effective at 
influencing policy by increasing the electorate’s awareness of what the government is 
actually doing to implement land reform. 
  The multiple-principal, multiple-task model of interest group pressure is 
presented in the next section. This model captures three important aspects of the relation 
between interest groups, the electorate and the government: i) the moral hazard that 
arises from the information asymmetries in the relation between interest groups and the 
policy makers; ii) the existence of multiple groups simultaneously pressuring the 
government for competing policies; and iii) the possibility that some groups may affect 
the level of information asymmetries between other groups and the government thereby 
indirectly changing the equilibrium level of effort on some policies. From the model we 
derive several characteristics that make an interest group more inclined to use the 
information channel on the electorate rather than contributions or votes. Then in Section 
IV we argue that the MST matches those characteristics and provide evidence that their 
                                                 
9 According to Reuben (2002), “Most of the information literature has concentrated on the information 
transmission between the interest group and the policymaker. It has neglected to look into the information 
flow among and within the interest groups.” Some exceptions are Grossman and Helpman (1999, 2001) 
and Cameron and Jung (1995).  5
actions do have the effect of increasing the pressure of the electorate on the government 
for land reform.  
 
 
III. A Multiprincipal, Multitask Model of Interest Group.
10    
Suppose there are n interest groups that have a stake in a given issue for which 
the government creates and implements policy.
11 We treat the interest groups as 
principals and government as the agent. In addition the voters are treated as the n+1
th 
principal. Each of the n+1 principals is interested in a specific dimension of policy and 
would like to see the government satisfy their preferences. We treat these dimensions as 
tasks that the principal would like the agent to perform. Given the limits on the agent’s 
time and resources, effort expended on one task reduces the level of effort that can be 
allocated to another. The vector of government effort toward land reform is 
1 2 1 ... ' + = n t t t t , where the prime denotes a transpose. 
In general the principals do not observe the level of effort placed by the 
government in each task, instead they observe the outcome of that effort. The vector of 






















        ( 1 )  
where ε~N(0,Ω) and Ω is the covariance matrix of the random noise variable ε.  
Ω is a (n+1)x(n+1) matrix with principal diagonal ωii, i=1, 2, … n+1, and zeros 
elsewhere. 
  Principal i benefits from the government’s actions according to the benefit 
functions bi, which can be written as: 
                                                 
10 This model is based on that by Dixit (1996, pg.157-171), which is a combination of the multitask model 
of Holmström and Milgrom (1991) and the multiprincipal model of Bernheim and Whinston (1986). 
11 Here we present the model with n+1 agents. In the appendix we elaborate the model for the specific 
case of land reform in Brazil, with landowners, voters and MST as the three agents.  6
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where 
i
j b  is the benefit of outcome j, j=1, 2, … n+1, to principal i. 
The cost to politicians of directing effort in both of the tasks is modeled as the 
following quadratic function: 
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where the matrix C is assumed positive definite. If the off-diagonal terms are 
positive there will be substitution amongst types of effort, so that an increase in ti will 
imply a decrease in tj, and vice-versa. If these terms are negative the types of effort will 
be complementary 
Following Dixit (1996) we first assume a benchmark case where the principals 
observe the levels of effort chosen by politicians and additionally are able to act 
cooperatively so as to reach the first-best solution. Subsequently we relax the principals’ 
capacity to observe effort but retain cooperation. The next step is to relax this assumption 
and have the principals act non-cooperatively. This last step first is done with interest 
groups influencing policy only through contributions and votes. Subsequently the 
principals expend effort to affect the level of information received by all parties so as to 
strategically force politicians to change policy.  
 
Observable effort and united principals 
In order to establish the pay-offs to politicians we define their motivation. We 
assume that their efforts in pursuing the n+1 tasks are rewarded with political support 
from each of the principals. The support is in the form of monetary contributions and 
votes. In general we expect narrow interest groups to work mostly through contributions, 
and voters through their votes, but this need not be the case. Let the support provided by 
each principal be pi. The total level of political support received is the sum of the support  7






. Offering political support imposes on the 
principals an opportunity cost so we can treat p in monetary terms. That is, p can be 
thought of as the amount of resources that the politicians would require for advertising 
and campaigning to achieve an equivalent amount of support. The pay-off to politicians 
is thus w = p – ½ t’Ct. The politicians’ utility function is assumed to have the following 
constant risk-aversion form: 
U(w) = -exp(-rw)  or  -exp-r(p – ½ t’Ct))     (4) 
where r is the risk-aversion coefficient. Note that politicians will maximize w = p 
– ½ t’Ct, the income equivalent of their utility. 
The expected return to the principals acting together is their benefit minus the 
value or cost of providing political support to politicians. 
  Ebx p Eb t p bt p [' ] [' ( ) ] ' −= + − = − ε    (5) 
The total surplus is therefore the sum of the agent’s and the principals’ net benefit  
bt p p tC t bt tC t '/ ' ' / ' −+− = − 1 2 1 2 . Note that the level of political support 
cancels out, so we assume that p is high enough for the agent to stay in the game, that is, 
legislators will not abandon these policies. The level of effort will be chosen to maximize 
this function, giving as the first-order condition b – Ct = 0, so that the first best level of 
effort is: 
t = C
-1b                 ( 6 )  
where C
-1 is the inverse of the C matrix. Note that given the assumption that C is 
positive definite, the diagonal elements of C
-1 are positive, while the off-diagonal 
elements can take any sign. Thus, an increase in bj, the benefit of task j to the united 
principals, leads to increased effort in that task. The increase in bj can either increase or 
reduce the effort towards the other n tasks, depending on the C matrix, that is, on the 
interactions of the cost parameters and whether each pair of tasks are complements or 
substitutes. 
 
Asymmetric information and united principals 
Because effort is now no longer observable to general voters, contracts between 
the principals and politicians must be made contingent on x (outcomes) and no longer on 
t (effort). Following Dixit (1996) and Holmström and Milgrom (1991) we use a linear 
reward scheme to stipulate the legislators’ pay-offs given outcomes x. That is, given the  8
observed outcomes x, the united principals provide politicians political support that has 
the following monetary equivalent: 














L     (7) 
where the αs are the value of the marginal support given by the principals to 
government effort and β is a fixed payment that can be adjusted to assure the agent’s 
reservation utility is at least matched. 
Thus the politicians’ utility is now –exp(-r(α’x + β - ½ t’Ct)), which can be 
shown to equal
12 –exp(-rα’t + ½ r
2α’Ωα - rβ + ½ rt’Ct)) so that legislators will now 
maximize the income equivalent of their  utility, which is  z = α’t - ½ rα’Ωα + β - ½ 
t’Ct. This yields the following first-order conditions: 
  t = C
-1α          ( 8 )  
Note that the αs are the value of the marginal support given by the principals to 
reward the government’s effort. Letting k be the elements of C
-1, kjj > 0 and kjh ≥ or ≤ 0, 
for j≠ h, so an increase in the marginal support of the united principals to politicians, αj, 
leads to increased effort in task j and an increase or a decrease in effort towards the other 
tasks. 
In order to understand the relationship of α in (8) and b in (6) substitute (8) into 
the government’s income equivalent of utility, z, to get z = ½ α’C
-1α - ½ rα’Ωα + β.  
The net benefit of the principals is the expected value of their total benefit minus the 
value, or cost, of the support they give the government, E[b’x - α’x- β] = (b - α)’t - β.  
The joint surplus of the united principals and politicians is the sum of their net benefits: 
b’C
-1α - ½ α’(rΩ + C
-1) α       (9) 
This can be maximized with respect to α to obtain the following first-order 
condition: 
  b = (I + rCΩ)α         ( 1 0 )  
Note that; (i) all elements of C are positive (assuming substitutability amongst 
tasks); (ii) the elements of Ω are positive, because they are variances; (iii) the αs are 
                                                 
12 See Dixit (1996, pg. 161).  9
positive, because the united principals will not want negative effort. Therefore it must be 
that  bj  >  αj.  Consequently, comparing (6) to (8) it turns out that the government 
optimally chooses less effort when effort is not observable than in the first-best situation 
where it is. This is the standard second-best story where, as a result of moral hazard 
arising from information asymmetries, less effort is realized in each tasks. In other 
words, the incentives in the case of asymmetric information are more low-powered than 
in the full-information case, which is due to the fact that in the second-best case there is a 
sharing of risk between the principals and legislators. 
 
Asymmetric information and multiple principals 
In general principals do not act cooperatively, so we now derive the optimal 
levels of effort allowing for non-cooperative behavior in addition to asymmetric 
information. In order to do this we will find the Nash equilibrium of the game where each 
principal strategically takes into account the actions of the other principals. Now each 
principal provides his own agenda to politicians. Principal i's incentive scheme for task j 
is αβ j
ii x +  while the total for each principal is α
i’x+β
i.  The aggregate incentive scheme 
faced by legislators is the sum of that offered by each principal and is simply α’x+β, 
where  α  =Σ  α
i and β  =Σ  β 
i. The marginal benefit function for principal i is 
b




12 1 . 
Politicians still maximize their certainty equivalent and choose effort according to    
t = C
-1α as in (8). In order to find the Nash equilibrium of this game we follow Dixit 
(1996:163-166) and consider the contribution of each of the principals to the legislators’ 
certainty equivalent. This is then added to the benefit that each principal receives from 
the relationship with politicians. The resulting bilateral surplus between principal i and 
politicians is:  
  bC r C r
ii i i i i −− − −−+
11 1
2
αα α α α '' ( ) ΩΩ     ( 1 1 )  






, the sum of the incentives by all other principals apart 
from i.  10
If we assume that the only choice variable available to principal i is the support it 
gives directly to legislators through votes and/or money, then the maximization of this 
objective function with respect to α
i gives: 
  b
i = (I + rCΩ)α
i + r CΩα
-i      (12) 
Adding the individual benefit of each principal gives us an expression for the total 
benefit arising from the Nash equilibrium: 
b = α + (n+1)rΩCα            ( 1 3 )  
This equation can be compared to equation (10), the total benefit that resulted 
when principals were able to act cooperatively: b =(I + rCΩ)α . Remembering that when 
α=b and the first-best solution is achieved, we can see that with non-cooperative 
principals a situation is reached that is even further from first-best than with unified 
principals, since r is now multiplied by n+1. The situation is therefore a third-best, 
characterized by apparent inefficiencies and low-powered incentives. In fact the 
inefficiencies are simply a direct consequence of the multiprincipal multitask nature of 
the problem. 












== ∑∑ αω α (() ) ,
11
        i,j,k,h =1,2,...,n+1         (14) 
  Note that each of the (n+1)
2 equations in this system contains the terms 
ωkk (k=1,2,…,n+1), which represent the variance of the noise between the observable 
outcomes x
k and the unobservable effort t
k.  Therefore, the higher the value of any given 
ωkk, the larger will be the wedge between the first-best situation, bi
j
i
j =α , and the third-
best situation depicted in (14). In other words, the greater the information asymmetry 
concerning legislators’ efforts in any given task, the more low powered will be the 
incentives given by the principals for efforts towards that task. 
 
Affecting information availability to pursue policy 
Suppose now that each of the n+1 principals can influence policy not only 
through direct incentives (cash, votes) represented by α
i, but also by affecting the level of 
information available concerning politicians’ efforts in each task, that is, on each of the 
n+1 ωkk’s. The problem faced by each interest group then becomes that of deciding not  11
only the optimal level of α j
i to allocate for each task j, but also on how much effort it will 
place towards affecting the information available to general voters regarding each of the 
tasks. Let the effort by each interest group i to influence the information concerning 
legislators’ efforts in each task j be ee e e
ii i
n
i ' ... = + 12 1 .  When deciding on the 
optimal level of e
i the interest group will take two factors into account. The first is that 
effort is costly, where the cost of that effort is represented by the cost function G
i(e
i). The 
second is the fact that all other interest groups may also expend efforts to affect 
information availability, so that the solution will be a Nash equilibrium. Let e
i −  be the 
vector of effort of all interest groups other than i.  Interest group i’s objective is no longer 
to maximize equation (11) with respect to α
i  but rather to maximize the following 
objective function with respect to α
i and e
i taking α 
-i and e
-i as given: 
bC r ee C r ee Ge
iii i i ii i i i i i '' ( , ) ' ( ( , ) ) ( )
−−− − − −− + −
11 1
2
αα α α α ΩΩ    (15) 
Note that the difference of (15) to (11) is the cost function and the fact that the 
matrix of information variances is now a function of the level of effort by each principal 
to influence information. The first order conditions for the maximization of (15) are: 
Cb r C r
ii i −− − −− +=
11 0 ΩΩ αα ()        ( 1 6 )  







2 α         ( 1 7 )  
where a


































































































The first order conditions in (16) are a system of n+1 equations that define α
i*, 
the  n+1 optimal incentives by principal i  for each task. The interpretation of these 
equations is as before in (12); the principal will offer a third-best level of incentive for  12
each task due to the information asymmetries and the existence of n other principals who 
are also providing incentives to the government. 
The first order conditions in (17) are also a system of n+1 equations. They define 
e
i*, the optimal level of effort that principal i will place towards affecting information 
availability on each of the n+1 tasks. The two terms on the left of each equation in that 
system show how much the marginal effort increases or reduces the wedge between the 
first-best situation b
i = α
i and the third-best situation b
i =α
i + r CΩα
  (derived from 
(16)). Those two terms are therefore the marginal benefit from effort e
i, whereas the term 
Ge
i  is the marginal cost. 
It is possible to perform comparative statics on this system to see what happens to 
optimal incentives for political action with a change in the level of information available. 
The direction of change depends on the other parameters of the model. Intuitively, each 
principal will increase the incentives provided for a given task when more information 
becomes available regarding it. Those who benefit from that task will want to provide 
more incentives now that they have a better notion of what they are getting from 
politicians in exchange. Those who oppose the task will give fewer negative incentives 
(more positive incentives), since the returns from opposition are reduced. However these 
reactions may be reversed depending of the relative values of the cost and benefit 
functions, C and b
i.  Whatever the case, each interest group can strategically calculate 
how much and in which direction to affect information so as to pursue its policy 
preferences.  
 
Implications from the model for interest groups’ choice of instrument 
In order to illustrate the working of the model in a situation often observed in 
practice, assume that in a given policy area the government’s main constraint are voters. 
That is, the value of α
v, the support (or opposition) given by the voters, is the largest part 
of the total support received by the government for all the tasks in this policy issue. Take 
from (16) the expression that defines α j
v , the optimal level of incentives that the voters 
will offer politicians for an additional unit of effort on task j:
13 
  bj
v = α j
v  + (rCΩα)j         ( 1 8 )  
                                                 
13 Where (rCΩα)j is the j
th element of this (n+1) x 1 vector.  13
Suppose that task j is interest group’s i task of interest so that it would gain if the 
voters increased their incentives to politicians for that task. At a given level of 
information availability, that is a given Ω, the voters will be offering α j
v *, which is less 
than the first best level bj
v, the difference between them being (rCΩα)j.
14 If the voters are 
favorable to task j, then bj
v - which is an exogenous parameter - will be positive. 
Therefore interest group i can gain by putting effort towards changing ωjj in Ω so as to 
reduce the term (rCΩα)j. Whether this entails increasing ωjj (obfuscation) or reducing it 
(making trueful information available) depends on the signs of the elements in α and C 
since r and Ω  are always positive. Note that α includes the incentive of each principal 
for each task, which are endogenously determined, and C includes parameters that are 
negative if another task is a complement to task j and positive if a substitute. Interest 
group i will assess all this information and either obfuscate or provide more information 
so as to lead the voters to provide a higher level of α j
v *. Greater incentives lead to more 
effort by politicians, which in turn results in more outcomes in that task, thus benefiting 
interest group i. How much effort interest group i will choose to apply towards pursuing 
this benefit is determined by the first order conditions in (17), which show the marginal 
gains and marginal costs of an additional unit of effort to affect information. 
The previous paragraph analyzed the decision of only one interest group as to the 
amount of influence that they should exert on how much to influence the level of 
information about the effort of legislators towards one task. We chose voters for this 
example because in practice they are typically one of the major constraints on policy 
choices of legislators. However, the model in its general form has each principal giving 
incentives α
i for each n+1 tasks and affecting information on each task through e
i. In 
addition each principal is aware that the others will also act this way and takes that into 
account when making his decisions. The final effect on government effort, and 
consequently on outcomes, thus depends on the net result of all these simultaneous 
forces. 
In practice we would not expect each of the n+1 interest groups to be able to 
influence information on each of the n+1 tasks, but rather that each group would have a 
                                                 
14 Note that if there were no risk aversion, r=0, or if there were no information asymmetries, Ω = 0, then 
rCΩα would equal a null vector and the first-best level of incentives would be offered.  14
comparative advantage in influencing particular tasks. That is, in real applications we 
would expect that the optimal incentives provided by each principal on some of the n+1 
tasks, as well as the optimal effort expended to influence information, to be corner 
solutions and equal zero. The reason for this is that it is typically not easy for an interest 
group to be able to affect the level of information, either to make things more transparent 
or to obfuscate. Doing so often requires special characteristics of the interest group that 
are hard to acquire, and indeed, may not be readily purchased or emulated. In some cases, 
for example, it may be credibility that leads voters to believe the interest group’s claims 
about what the government is actually doing. 
Whether an interest group will be successful in pursuing its policy interests 
through the manipulation of information depends on the characteristics of the interest 
group and the policy that it is pursuing. By isolating some of the elements in the first 
order conditions in (17) we can analyze three such characteristics of an interest group: 
i)  The higher the marginal cost of influencing information, Ge
i
j , the lower will 
be the optimal level of such effort chosen by that group, ceteris paribus. If the cost is 
sufficiently high, then the marginal cost will be above the marginal benefit for all 
positive level of effort, so that the group will not try to influence information available 
for that task. The fact that some interest groups pursue their objectives through 
contributions, rather than manipulating information may be due to the relative costs of 
the manipulating information being too high. Interest groups that are successful in 
pursuing policy goals through information manipulation thus have comparative cost 
advantages in these activities.  










− ) , ( ω
 can be interpreted as the productivity of effort by 
an interest group to influence information. The more an additional unit of effort changes 
ωjj, the more productive the group and the more influence it will have over policy for 
each dollar spent in effort. Low productivity for some groups may be due to their lack of 
credibility among voters. Accordingly interest groups that work through the information 
channel will tend to have reputation advantages and effective means of getting noticed. 
iii) The ability of an interest group to affect policy through information depends 
on the preferences of all n+1 principals, that is b. If voters care strongly about a given 
policy, either favorably or in opposition, then changes in the level of information they  15
receive can have large impacts on the government’s effort level for that policy. If they 
are closer to indifference however, then pursuing that task by influencing information 
will be less fruitful ceteris paribus, even for a group well endowed with the other 
characteristics. 
In the next section we argue that the MST matches the characteristics described 
above and pursues its policy objectives by influencing the information held by voters. 
 
 
IV. The Informational Role of the MST 
In this section we analyze the recent history of land reform in Brazil in the light 
of that model and show that the MST’s methods and characteristics fit our portrayal of 
an interest group that pursues its goals by affecting the level and quality of information 
received by the other groups and voters concerning the government’s actions. 
In order to understand the impact of the landless peasant movement it is useful 
to apply the model to land reform politics in Brazil with and without the MST, so as to 
capture the period before and after that group became active throughout the country. In 
the pre-MST period the model would have as principals the landowners and voters. The 
landless peasants and rural workers could also be considered principals, but because 
they lacked organization they had little power to affect government policy. The “task” 
for landowners was to either block expropriations or if some land reform had to occur, it 
should include policies that benefited them as well, through government credit and other 
subsidies. Both of these actions would reduce the resources available for actual land 
reform.   
The second group, urban voters sympathize with land reform.
15 Voters often 
mistakenly view land reform as costless to them and the country.
16 Although urban 
                                                 
15 Several public opinion polls have been conducted over time to gauge society’s position towards land 
reform. Almeida (1998) reviews eight opinion polls from 1962 to 1998, thus covering a large span of land 
reform history, and shows that there has consistently been broad support towards land reform. These polls 
were undertaken under very different methodologies and samples, but all overwhelmingly reflect the fact 
that Brazilian society has consistently viewed land reform favorably. In 1998, for example, a poll 
conducted by IBOPE revealed that 80% of those interviewed were “in favor of land reform.” 
16 Expropriation for the purpose of land reform in Brazil is, by constitutional mandate, compensated at 
‘fair’ value, though much of it in Titles of the Agrarian Debt, so that there are high costs for obtaining 
land as well as the expenditures to settle and maintain the beneficiary families. In 2004 the budget for 
INCRA, the federal land reform agency, was R$ 2.5 billion (approximately US$ 833 million) though in 
the end 5.98% of this was frozen by the central government to contribute towards primary surplus targets. 
In 2004 81,254 families are claimed by the government to have been settled.   16
voters support land reform, it is not a central preoccupation. They naturally are more 
concerned about issues which affect them more directly such as unemployment, 
inflation, health and crime. Consequently, they are only imperfectly informed on what 
the government is really doing in terms of land reform. Before the MST became active, 
voter information on land reform was essentially what the government presented.  
The equilibrium resulting from this situation was one where the government 
announced land reform programs but never really implemented them. This equilibrium 
changed once the MST is introduced into the model. The MST is a well-organized 
interest group with a comparative advantage in influencing the information received by 
voters. This is done through highly-publicized farm occupations, marches, invasions of 
governmental offices, roadblocks, and accusations that the government is stalling. 
Through these actions voters revised their views regarding the government’s 
commitment toward land reform and increased their political pressure for more action. 
In this new scenario the equilibrium level of government effort for the land reform 
‘task’ is greater than in the pre-MST scenario. That this corresponds to reality is 
suggested by Graphs 1 and 2, which show that circa 1993 the MST became more active, 
increasing the number of invasions and occupations of private farms (Graph 1). This 
resulted in greater budgets for land reform (Graph 2) which in turn led to greater 
numbers of settled families of landless peasants (Graph 1).
 17  
                                                 
17 Heredia et al. (2002) find that in a large sample 96% of land reform settlement projects emerge from 
some form of conflict rather than government initiative. They also show that although there are several 
other groups, the MST is by far the most active. The drop in occupations and settlements after 1999 can 
be attributed to several factors. By that time so many families had been settled that the MST’s main focus 
shifted to pressuring the government to make good on its pledges of credit to those families rather than 
obtaining more land for new families. This is important for the MST as it receives 1-4% of all the credit 
provided to settled families. Also, in 1999 the economy passed through a severe crisis involving a large 
devaluation of the real. In the following years the government successfully dealt with this crisis by 
pursuing strict fiscal restraint (Alston, Melo, Mueller and Pereira, 2006), which severely constrained the 
governments land reform effort. Finally, in the year before the 2002 presidential election, the MST 





























































































































Source: Ministério do Desenvovlvimento Agrário (2004: 20), Comissão Pastoral 
da Terra (2004:13). 
Note: Data for number of families settled from 1988 to 1994 is the average for 
each government; Sarney (1988-89), Collor (1990-91), Franco (1992-94). 
                                                 
18 Data on the number of families settled is highly controversial as this is the main indicator in the public 
debate on how much land reform the government has achieved. There is a constant war of numbers 
between the government and the MST, involving also academia and the media, as to what has in fact been 
accomplished. Despite some attempts at doing a census of settlement projects the controversy persists in 
part due to the political nature of the issue and in part due to the sheer logistic difficulty of counting 
settled families in what is a very dynamic setting where new settlements are constantly being created and 
where beneficiaries are constantly selling, trading and abandoning their land. If, for example, new 
families have been settled in an old abandoned settlement project, should they be counted as fulfilling part 
of the government’s target? The numbers in Graph X are from the Lula government and revise downward 















































































































































Source: Gasques and Verde (1999). Constant Sept. 1998 US$. 
  19
To illustrate, consider the situation regarding land reform after the election of 
President Lula in late 2002. The President and his party stressed land reform, but to 
avoid past inaction that followed elections and that seemed to be occurring in 2003, 
MST’s leader announced that in April 2004 the movement would initiate a campaign of 
occupations that would lead to a “red April.” This threat of violence forced the new 
government to increase its pace of land reform, expropriating 34 farms in April 
(Ornaghi, 2004). Its most important effect, however, was to make voters aware that land 
reform was still not moving forward.   
The MST has the characteristics outlined in the model that underlie a 
comparative advantage in information control: (i) low marginal cost of affecting 
information received by other groups; (ii) high productivity of effort in affecting 
information; (iii) extreme configuration of preferences of other principals, particularly 
voters; and (iv) favorable cost relations (complementarities and substitutabilities) 
between its favored task and other principals’ tasks.  
 
i) Low marginal cost of affecting information (G e
i
j ). 
It is straightforward that interest groups that have low marginal costs of affecting 
information will pursue more of that strategy, ceteris paribus. The MST works closely 
with the media and maintains a flow of newsworthy events. The purpose here is to show 
that the MST is able to pursue these actions at relatively low cost. Before doing so, 
however, it is important to note that our argument does not require that voters approve 
of the MST and invasions of private farms. What is important is that the MST is 
continually able to elicit press coverage, that voters approve of land reform, and that the 
MST’s actions impart information to them on the government’s efforts towards that end. 
An important characteristic affecting the costs of the MST’s strategies is that 
they are extremely labor intensive, requiring large contingents of people to be mobilized 
for long periods of time. The invasion and occupation of a farm, and the process of 
transforming the occupied farm into an official land reform settlement, are procedures 
that can take several years, during which the potential beneficiaries go through extreme 
and unrelenting physical and emotional stress. An invasion typically requires the group 
(generally 30 to 500 people) camp out in neutral territory, such as by the side of a 
highway, for long periods, often months, awaiting the right time to act. The camps are  20
traditionally composed of cheap black plastic and cardboard tents that have become so 
much associated with the image of landless peasants. The invasion may go through 
peacefully or may involve violent conflict.
19 The occupied farm is similarly made up of 
makeshift tents and living conditions are only slightly better than in the previous camps. 
After an invasion there are eviction attempts, either by the landowner with private 
militia or by police following a court order for “reintegration of possession.” If there is 
an eviction, the group generally will return to a provisional camp to await the right time 
to reinvade the same property or start over on another one. This cycle can be repeated 
several times and many years can go by before progress is made. To maintain order the 
MST imposes strict discipline in its camps, where, for example, no alcohol is allowed, 
settlers can only leave with permission and for limited periods of time, and all work is 
done collectively. In addition there is constant indoctrination of the settlers on the goals 
of land reform and other political objectives. The movement has more than 1,000 
schools in their settlements where they teach their own curriculum despite being 
financed by the state (Weinberg, 2004).
20  
  This description shows that the means used by the MST to affect the information 
received by other parties on the government’s land reform effort involves mobilizing 
very large numbers of people and convincing them to undergo extreme hardship for 
long periods of time.
21 Practically all of the interest group literature since Olson (1965) 
and Stigler (1971) has recognized the ability to overcome free-rider problems and low 
costs of organization as key determinants of interest group success. MST’s ability to 
maneuver a large contingent of people for whatever task is necessary to attract attention, 
no matter how grueling, tedious or dangerous, is key to the MST’s success. It is the low 
opportunity cost of landless peasants that enables the MST to control its members. Most  
                                                 
19 From 1985 to 2003 there were 13,524 conflicts for land in Brazil, most of which involved an invasion 
and the subsequent resistance to eviction (Comissão Patoral da Terra, 2004). A graph of the number of 
conflicts follows closely the number of occupations in Graph 1. 
20 Despite the biased content of the education that is provided in the schools in settlement projects (Karl 
Marx, Che Guevara and the Chinese revolution are major topics), it is nevertheless education and children 
that otherwise might not have had the chance, learn to read and write. In 1995 the MST received a prize 
from UNICEF in recognition of their work in educating children. 
21 From 1995 to 2002 423,813 families were settled in 5,100 official land reform projects most of which 
arisen from MST occupations, Heredeia et al. (2002). This number indicates that the MST is quite adept 
are recruiting members.  21
MST members are extremely poor with little to lose and nowhere to return.
22 The lack 
of alternatives makes them more receptive to accept the hardships imposed on them by 
the movement without rebellion or desertion. With such low opportunity costs, the 
distant promise of a piece of land is sufficiently attractive so as to make participation in 
an occupation a worthwhile prospect.
23  
It is important to consider not only the MST’s cost of influencing information, 
but also that of their chief competitor, landowners. As noted by Becker (1983) what 
matters in competition between interest groups is not absolute but rather relative 
pressure success. Landowners have considerable financial resources that could be used 
to influence the availability of information if that proved to be a productive means of 
affecting policy. Land owners are well organized and have overcome the free-rider 
problem. In the late 1980s the landowners even formed a political party, the UDR 
(União Democratica Rural) to fight land reform. What is relevant for our analysis is the 
marginal cost facing land owners of influencing voter information as compared to the 
benefits they receive from doing so. Marginal cost includes the opportunity cost of not 
using those resources on direct influence, as well as on other productive activities or 
consumption. It is reasonable to assume that those opportunity costs are considerably 
higher for landowners, relatively, than they are for the landless peasants, where the 
resources are mostly in the form of time and effort for which they have much fewer 
alternative uses. 
 
                                                 
22 In this regard Wright and Wolford (2003: 54) cite a settler’s recollection of his days in an MST 
occupation: “We lost what little we had when we went to the encampment. We could take little even of 
those few things that we owned into the new encampment, the only thing we took was our (wood-
burning) cook stove. What little savings we had were soon gone, because we were earning nothing. We 
had no house nor land to return to, no household goods, hardly any clothing, very few of our tools – 
everything was lost. And there was no way to go back and be the same person again to the old neighbors, 
the friends on the outside.” In other passages the authors also document several positive memories that 
settlers held from the occupation days, in particular the camaraderie and the sense of empowerment from 
participating in the movement. 
23 With the large number of landless peasants that have been settled and given land in the past fifteen 
years, the stock of actual landless peasants, that is, those that really have aptitude to work the land rather 
than simply being poor, has reduced and it may become harder for the MST to recruit in the future. 
Graziano (2004) argues that there are no more true landless in Brazil and that current MST occupations 
are filled mostly with poor, unemployed people living in bad conditions in the cities.  22
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The second characteristic for an interest group to be successful at influencing 
information received by other groups is the productivity of those efforts. Even if an 
interest group manages to get its message through it may have no effect if it has no 











− ) , ( ω means that the information asymmetry between 
the government’s actions and the other groups’ (especially the voters’) perceptions of 
those efforts can be greatly affected by additional efforts of group i at reducing or 
increasing that asymmetry. A low value means that those efforts have low payoffs. The 
derivative thus measures the productivity of efforts to affect information. This is an 
important characteristic as it is one that is difficult to attain. Even an interest group that 
commands resources may find that its investments in advertising bring little persuasion. 
They lack credibility or reputation. This is why interest groups typically link their 
objectives with the broader public interest. The MST, by ostensibly helping the landless 
poor in a country riddled by an extremely skewed land distribution, has been able to 
garner credibility, despite its illegal nature and disrespect for private property, which 
otherwise most Brazilians support. As noted by the Economist (1997)  in 1996 the MST 
“won the ultimate accolade: sympathetic portrayal in a prime-time soap opera on Globo, 
Brazil’s leading television station.” By contrast, landowners have found it hard to appeal 
to public sympathy. All their attempts at publicity have had very little effect in changing 
their image as wealthy and trigger-happy hoarders of large unproductive tracts of land.  
  Thus far, we have argued that the MST is not only more adept than landowners 
and other groups at getting their message through, but also that their message is more 
effective at altering the level of pressure exerted by voters on the government. Aware 
that their claims regarding the problems with the government’s land reform will sound 
self-serving, the landowners prefer to center their efforts at pressuring the government 
through their representatives in Congress, which is consistent with what the model 
would predict for a group with high marginal costs of affecting information and low 
productivity of effort. 
  23
iii) Extreme configuration of preferences of other principals (b) 
  The third characteristic which the model indicates that an interest group should 
have for it to be successful in controlling information is an extreme configuration of the 
preferences of the other actors. If several of the principals, and especially voters, feel 
strongly about the cause pursued by an interest group, then it has the opportunity to 
manipulate their demands on government by altering the information received about the 
government’s actions (Ω in the model). If, for example, an interest group pursues a task 
that voters approve (abhor) then they can elicit more (less) pressure from the voter on 
the government by reducing (increasing) the noise in the information received by voters 
on the government’s effort. If the voters are indifferent to, or only mildly interested in, 
that policy, then affecting the information they receive will have little effect on the 
incentives they provide politicians and the interest group would do better by pressuring 
through another channel. 
  Voters are sympathetic to land reform and this is critical for MST.  To illustrate 
the importance of land reform and the political pressure placed on the Brazilian 
President to implement it, we estimate a model of Presidential popularity, adding to the 
usual specification of economic and political explanatory variables another variable that 
includes the number of farm occupations by MST in the corresponding month. If we 
show that more MST farm occupations reduces the President’s popularity because they 
demonstrate a lack of effective policy, this will be evidence of the MST’s effectiveness 
in manipulating voter perceptions and forcing subsequent government action. 
  There is a large literature which suggests testing the determinants of presidential 
popularity by regressing measures of popularity, usually opinion poll data, against a 
series of variables that capture the state of the economy and political events (Price and 
Sanders, 1993; Edwards, 1991; Erikson, 1989; Markus, 1988; Monroe, 1984, Mueller, 
1973). There are no such studies for presidential popularity in Brazil. Our dependant 
variable is the percentage of the electorate that finds the President’s performance ‘very 
good / good’ or ‘regular’ (versus ‘very bad / bad’ and ‘don’t know’) in periodic public  24
opinion polls performed by Datafolha Insituto de Pesquisas (2002).
24 As explanatory 
variables we use monthly data on inflation, unemployment, interest rate, exchange rate, 
minimum wage and a dummy for July and August 2002 to capture the effect of Brazil’s 
winning of the World Cup.
25 In addition to these variables we add another that measures 
the number of occupations promoted by the MST and other landless groups in each 
month. This variable proxies the level of activity of the MST and should capture the 
perception of voters regarding the government’s effort on land reform. In order to rule 
out that our results may be spurious, we used only variables that were found to be 
integrated to the first order I(1) (except for dummies), as most macroeconomic variables 
tend to be, and subsequently tested for cointegration. This allows us to estimate both the 
long-term (or equilibrium) relationship between popularity and the explanatory 
variables, and subsequently to estimate the short term relationships through an error 
correction model. Counterintuitively, the value of monthly GDP was found to be 
stationary in the sample period and consequently this variable was not included in the 
regression, despite being a theoretically important predictor of popularity.
26 Note  
                                                 
24 Our period of analysis is January 1997 to December 2002. The initial date is constrained by the 
availability of monthly data on land occupations (www.cpt.org.br) and the final date is the last month of 
the second Cardoso term. There is data on Presidential approval rates for most months in the period. 
When no poll was performed that month, we repeat the value of the previous month. Descriptive statistics 
are shown below: 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Max. Min. 
Popularity 66.35  11.45  40 85 
Occupations 32.09  23.54  2  131 
Inflation 0.98  1.11  -0.38  5.84 
Min. Wage  221.63  18.13  194  258 
Unemployment 11.37  0.94  8.9  13.4 
Exchange rate  1.88  0.72  1.05  3.89 
Interest rate  1.68  0.49  1.02  3.33 
 
25 Upon returning to Brazil, the team went straight from the airport to the Presidential palace in Brasilia 
where they were given medals by the President on the balcony in front of an enormous crowd that had 
assembled to honor the heroes, an event televised to the rest of the country. The attempt by Presidents to 
associate themselves with victorious national soccer teams has been a tradition in Brazilian politics. Note 
however, that despite this notion that soccer is the ‘opium of the people’, Cardoso’s candidate lost the 
election to the Presidency three months after the World Cup. 
26 When we included GDP in the regression, ignoring the unit root problem, the estimated coefficient was 
found to be positive and significant. Its exclusion did not impact the results significantly.  25
however that the effect of GDP is captured in the other macroeconomic variables.
27  
  The results are presented in Table 1, where the first column shows a 
specification with each independent variable in times t and t-1 including only the 
economic variables and the World Cup dummies. In the second column we add the 
occupation variable, also in t and t-1, so as to determine the effect of the MST on 
presidential popularity. The third column uses a different specification selected through 
a general-to-specific methodology (Campos, Ericsson and Hendry, 2004) starting with 
variables in times t, t-1 and t-2. The coefficients can be interpreted as constant 
elasticities as the data are in logarithms (except for inflation and interest rates for which 
there are some negative valued observations). 
 
Table 1 – Presidential Popularity and Land Reform. 
Dep. Variable: 
Popularity 
I II  III 




























































                                                 
27 The relationship between macroeconomic variables such as inflation, exchange rates, interest rates, 
unemployment and minimum wage may raise concerns about muticollinearity. In this regard we note that: 
(i) examination of the correlation matrix for the sample period does not indicate that multicollinearity is 
severe in the sample used; (ii) using subsets of the explanatory variables does not alter the result for the 
occupations variable; and (iii) multicollinearity affects (increases) only the standard errors of the 
estimated coefficients and not their consistency, so that even in the presence of the problem the result for 
the occupation variable will still be valid.  26
Dep. Variable: 
Popularity 
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Notes: Ordinary least squares with Newey-West standard errors (2 lags). All variables 
in logarithms. All variables except dummies I(1). All models are cointegrated. 
 
 
The value of the minimum wage is a strong determinant of presidential 
popularity with positive and significant coefficients both in time t and t-1. In Brazil the 
President proposes minimum wage increases to Congress every year and the event 
always attracts a lot of attention. Not only is 20 percent of the working population, 
approximately 14 million people, affected, but in addition around 12 million other 
retirees and pensioners also benefit. In addition the minimum wage is also used as an 
index for jobs that earn exact multiples of the official minimum wage, a phenomenon 
known as the ‘light house effect’ (Neri, Gonzaga and Camargo, 2001). This puts the 
President in the difficult position of trading off popularity with fiscal responsibility, as a 
high minimum wage will strain the social security system. Our result shows that 
Presidents in Brazil are right to be wary of the effects on popularity of a smaller than  27
expected increase in the minimum wage. With all variables at their means, a one 
standard deviation increase in the minimum wage would increase popularity from 
65.4% to 79.4%. 
  The exchange rate was found to be negatively and significantly associated with 
popularity. The sample period includes periods of overvalued exchange rate, prior to 
January 1999, as well as the devaluation shock that occurred that month. A one standard 
deviation increase in the exchange rate (that is, a devaluation) decreases popularity from 
65.4% to 49.7%. Unemployment was estimated to have a negative and significant 
impact on popularity in t-1, and a positive though insignificant coefficient in t. The 
negative coefficient is higher than the positive, so that the overall impact of 
unemployment is negative. A one standard deviation increase in unemployment reduces 
popularity by 2.77 percentage points, with all variables at their means. Neither inflation 
nor interest rates had any statistically significant effect on popularity. Note however that 
in the specification in column III derived through a general-to-specific methodology, the 
estimated coefficient for interest rates is positive and significant, which is an 
unexpected result. The World Cup dummies, for 1998 and 2002, are both positive and 
significant, indicating that the national team’s championship in 2002 and, perhaps 
surprisingly for Brazil, being runner-up in 1998 rubbed off on to the President’s 
popularity. With all variables at their means, the 1998 result is estimated to have 
boosted Cardoso’s popularity by 12.33 percentage points and the 2002 result by 18.28. 
  When we add the farm occupation variable in column II, all the economic 
variables’ estimated coefficients remain approximately the same. The coefficients for 
occupation are negative and reliable significant. The estimation indicates that a one 
standard deviation increase of the number of farms occupied, with all other variables at 
their means, reduces presidential popularity by 6.22 percentage points from 60.9% to 
54.7%. This is a strong effect for a non-economic variable that doesn’t really affect 
most (urban) voters’ well-being directly. This result is consistent with our statements 
that Brazilians are strongly favorable towards land reform. Furthermore, it shows that 
there really is scope for the MST, through its occupations and other actions, to increase 
the pressure that voters put on the government for land reform. The more active the 
MST is, the more resources the President dedicates to land reform, not because he wants 
to placate the MST itself, but rather because voters would punish the President (loss of  28
popularity) when they perceive that land reform is not progressing as expected. The 
estimation in column III, with a different specification and lag structure, confirms the 
robustness of the results, with all results remaining basically the same, except as noted 
above the significance of the interest rate. Importantly the occupation variable is 
negative and significant in all three lag periods. 
  Because the series in Table 1 are cointegrated, they have an error correction 
representation (Engle and Granger, 1987) and we can estimate an error correction model 
that allows us to analyze both the short term effects of the explanatory variables on 
presidential popularity as well as the rate at which deviations from the long term 
equilibrium are corrected in each period.
28 The results are shown in Table 2. In the short 
term the only variable that has a significant impact on popularity is inflation, with 
increases in inflation reducing popularity. The error correction term is negative and 
significant at 5%, with a value of -0.17, which indicates that in each period 17% of 
deviations from the long term equilibrium are corrected. This is a relatively small 
coefficient, which indicates that the speed of adjustment of popularity to shocks in the 
explanatory variables is low.
29 
 
                                                 
28 The error correction equation is ∆Yt = α0 - α1 (Yt-1 - Xt-1β1) + β0 ∆Xt + εt, where Yt is popularity and Xt 
is the matrix of explanatory variables. In this model α1 is the rate at which deviations from the long term 
equilibrium are corrected, β0 is the short term effect of the explanatory variables on popularity, and β1 is 
the vector of equilibrium relations between the explanatory variables and popularity. 
29 Another characteristic of interest groups is whether their task is a complement or a substitute to the 
tasks of other principals, that is, the structure of the C matrix. A group whose task is a substitute 
(complement) to other groups’ tasks will observe negative (positive) incentives (that is, the α
-1’s) from 
those groups to the government for their task of interest. In the model the C matrix is common knowledge 
so by design an interest group can not try to manipulate the other groups’ perception of how their tasks 
affects these other groups cost. For this reason this characteristic was not included in the text. In principle, 
however, the model could be extended to include this additional information asymmetry. The MST does 
put much effort into influencing  policy through this additional channel by portraying land reform as 
complementary to other policies such as reducing poverty and crime in the cities as many landless often 
end up in urban slums. The MST also consistently portrays environmental policies as being 
complementary to land reform, such as in a document they released called “The MST and the 
Environment: Land Reform is a Way to Care for the Environment” (translated from Portuguese, cited in 
Lacey and Oliviera, 2001). For discussion on the relationship of the MST and the environment see Alston, 
Libecap and Mueller 1999a and 2000; Wright and Wolford, 2003: chap. 3; and Harnecker, 2003: chap. 9, 
600-602). Despite their pro-environmental rhetoric, it is likely that the large number of settlement projects 
harm the environment. The experience has been that most settlements already have a very hard time at 
becoming economically viable even in the best of circumstances. Being additionally constrained not to 
exploit the natural resources within their reach would necessarily make it more difficult. Faced with this 
trade-off (which the rhetoric tries to play down) the natural choice is to choose survival over nature.   29
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V. Concluding Remarks. 
  Our objective has been to explain how an interest group with limited resources 
could still influence public policy by molding the information available to general 
voters. We focused on the demonstrated success of the landless organization in Brazil, 
the MST. Since the mid 1990s, MST has forced political action on land reform, which 
historically has languished, by dramatizing the plight of the landless peasants whenever 
government policy seems to drift, often in response to the lobby efforts of rural property 
owners. We examined three characteristics which the model predicts as giving interest 
groups a comparative advantage in pursuing their goals by changing the amount and 
quality of the information received by other groups. We presented evidence to show that 
the MST possesses these characteristics. It is an interest group that has: i) a low cost 
means of attracting attention, due mainly to its ready supply of landless settlers willing 
to undertake extreme hardships in their quest for land; ii) credibility and a worthy cause 
which make the information they impart to other groups on the government’s land 
reform effort noticeable and believable; and iii) they benefit from voters caring about 
land reform and seeing the President as responsible for delivering results, so that the  30
MST’s efforts to convince voters that the President could do more results in more being 
done.  
In May 2005 the MST organized another high profile march of 12,000 landless 
peasants that ended in Brasilia where President Lula met them and admitted that he had 
not met the number of settled families he announced as targets in the beginning of his 
term. He promised: 1) to sent a presidential decree to Congress by the end of the month 
to provide an additional R$ 700 million for settlement projects;to hire 1,300 new staff 
members for INCRA, the land reform institute;  and 3) to tighten the criteria which 
determines how productive farms have to be so that they are immune from 
expropriation (Estado de São Paulo, May 17, 2005). The way which this event unfolded, 
with the MST calling attention to society about the President’s land reform record, and 
getting promises of more effort in return, conforms very closely to the argument of this 
paper. Our model of interest group behavior can be generalized to any interest group 
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Appendix 
 
Applying the Model to Land Reform Politics in Brazil 
This appendix expresses the general model in section II in terms of land reform 
politics in Brazil. We denote the principals with superscripts m, l , and v, for MST, 
landowners and voters, respectively. We denote the tasks related to each principal with 
the following subscripts: s for a policy of expropriation of private land and creation of 
settlement projects defended by the MST; p for the (non-) reform polices sought by 
landowners; and q for the reform policies sought by voters. Thus the level of effort 
placed by politicians on each task is ts, tp and tq. The principals observe outcomes, xs, xp 
and xq, but not effort, the relationship between them being xs = ts + εs, xp = tp + εp and xq 
= tq + εq, where εs, εp and εq are random noise variables with zero means and variance 
equal to ωss, ωpp and ωqq, respectively. The larger the value of ωjj the more difficult it is 
for the principals to infer the level of effort tj from the observation of the outcome xj. The 






i  ,   and   for i = v, l and m. 
Each of the principals offers a separate incentive scheme for each task contingent 











i xx x ++ + ,   and  for i = m, l and v, 
where α j
i  is the marginal support given by principal i for task j, and β j
i  a corresponding 
lump sum transfer. The equilibrium to the interaction among all the players is 
characterized by the following expressions (which correspond to the first order 
conditions described in (16) and (17) in section II): 
(A3)                           
(A2)                         
(A1)                            















rc rc rc b
rc rc rc b
rc rc rc b
α ω α ω α ω α
α ω α ω α ω α
α ω α ω α ω α
+ + + =
+ + + =
+ + + =
 
(A6)                                             ) (
(A5)                                            ) (


























































α ω α α ω
α ω α α ω
α ω α α ω
 




















 and the superscript –i means the sum of that variable for the two 
principal other than i. 
Remember that the first-best situation occurs when bi
j equals α i
j , and that the 
solution here is third-best. Incentives are blunted not only by asymmetric information, 
but also by the fact that there is more than one principal trying to influence legislators’ 
choice of effort in each task.  Equations (A1) to (A6) can be solved to give the optimal 
incentives, α j
i *, and the optimal effort to affect information, ej
i *, given the value of all 
the parameters (bi
j’s, r, c’s and ω’s). 
We characterize the MST’s role in pressuring politicians to step up land reform 
efforts as follows. By calling attention to the government’s poor performance in settling  38
the large contingent of landless peasant families, the MST puts a positive level of effort, 
es
m, to reduce ωss.  The lower ωss affects the incentives of each principal for each task. 
The equilibrium levels of all α j






v =+ + . The greater part of the change in αs comes from the effect of 
ωss on the incentives given by the voters, α s
v . Faced with stronger incentives for 
settlement projects, the government optimally reacts by putting more effort towards that 
task. This in turn leads to an increase in the outcome xs. This implies an increase in 
settlements, which in turn increases the benefits received by MST as well as the benefits 
perceived by voters. 